Abstract-The authenticated encryption scheme allows one signer to generate an authenticated cipher-text so that no one except the designated verifier can recover the message and verify the message. In a (t, n) threshold authenticated encryption scheme, any t or more signers can generate an authenticated encryption for a message and send it to the designated verifier. Compared with the conventional encryption-then-signature schemes, threshold authenticated encryption schemes can meet more security requirements, including robustness, confidentiality, unforgeability, integrity, authenticity and non-repudiation. Based on Tseng and Jan's authenticated encryption scheme and elliptic curve cryptosystem, Chung et al. [2] recently proposed an efficient (t, n) threshold authenticated encryption scheme which can reduce the load of the signers by applying a division-of-labor signature technique. However, the paper demonstrates that there exists a design defect, the threshold authentication signature scheme cannot resist against insider attack and the scheme is not robust. Then, an improved authenticated encryption scheme based on elliptic curve cryptosystem is proposed. The novel authenticated encryption scheme removes the above-mentioned weaknesses.
I. INTRODUCTION
The authenticated encryption scheme is first introduced by Nyberg and Rueppel [3, 4] . Such schemes incorporate the characteristics of both message encryption and the digital signature; that is, after a signer generates a signature on a message, only the specified verifier can recover the message, authenticate the sender of the message and verify the integrity of the message. Since the authenticated encryption schemes can meet more security requirements than traditional encryption and digital signature schemes, it has been extensively studied [5, 6, 7, 8] . More focuses are on reducing the communication and operation costs [5, 6] . In order to ensure that message can be recovered from the signature, a message always is hashed in the signatures. Hashing a message can also reduce its size in the signature schemes. However, for authentication encryption schemes, hashing a message can not reduce the size of the authenticated cipher-text since message must be recovered. For an over-large message, two techniques to reduce the communication and operating costs are proposed. One of the techniques is like this: message is first divided into message blocks, then some redundant bits which demonstrate the linkage of the message are added into each block, and the signer encrypts and signs each block. The other technique is adding message linkage and adding the secret for the (i-1)-th message block into the generated signature in the i-th message block [6, 7, 8] . However, these techniques have some flaws. The former will increase communication costs. For the latter, if the (i-1)-th signature block is altered, then the i-th message block cannot be recovered. So, the verifier cannot proceed with the recovery of the message blocks until the verifier receives all the signature blocks. Obviously, such schemes cannot be applied in message flow transmission [9] .
Based on threshold cryptosystems [10, 11] and Tseng and Jan's [1] authenticated encryption scheme, Chung et al. [2] recently proposed an efficient (t, n) threshold authenticated encryption scheme. Chung et al. introduced a concept of labor division to reduce the workload of every signer in the threshold scheme. The main idea of the concept is that the message is divided into a few readable message blocks such that each signer only needs to examine and sign the message block assigned to him [2] , then all sub-signatures on all the message blocks are combined into one group signature for the whole message.
Compared with the conventional encryption-thensignature schemes, threshold authenticated encryption schemes can meet more security requirements [16, 22, 23, 24, 25] , such as robustness, integrity, confidentiality, unforgeability, authenticity and non-repudiation.
-Robustness. In a (t, n) threshold signature scheme (1≤ t ≤ n), if at least t signers in the group follow honestly the protocol, then a valid signature can be generated. Supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (10961013).
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-Confidentiality. Any information cannot be derived from the authenticated cipher-text by any one except the designated verifier.
-Unforgeability. The authenticated signature is not forgeable.
-Authenticity. The designated verifier can identify the signer group of a given threshold signature.
-Nonrepudiation. A valid signature can be generated only by t or more signers. The signer group cannot deny that the signature is generated by the group. Based on the elliptic curve cryptosystems [12, 13] , the (t, n) threshold authenticated encryption scheme in [2] combines the characteristics of both message linkage and division-of-labor. After a detailed performance and security analysis, Chung et al. claimed that their scheme can reach high security with low computational cost. For simplicity, the scheme is called CHC scheme hereafter.
However, the paper demonstrates that there exists a design defect, the threshold authentication signature scheme cannot resist against insider attack and the scheme is not robust. An improved authenticated encryption scheme based on elliptic curve cryptosystem is proposed. The novel authenticated encryption scheme removes all the above-mentioned weaknesses.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. CHC scheme is briefly reviewed in Section 2 and the analysis of CHC scheme is shown in Section 3. Section 4 and Section 5 propose a novel authenticated signature scheme and give a detailed analysis of the novel scheme, respectively. Section 6 concludes.
II. REVIEW OF CHC SCHEME In CHC scheme [2] , {u 1 , u 2 ,…, u n } denotes the signer group with n signers where u i is the i-th signer (i=1,2,… ,n). Each signer u i has its public information x i . An overlarge message is divided into t readable message blocks among the actual signer group of t members. Each participant in the actual signer group only needs to sign the message block assigned to him. U v is the designated verifier. CHC scheme consists of three phases.
A. System initialization phase
The trusted system authority (SA) first selects a large prime integer p, a finite field F p , the point group E(F p ) of an elliptic curve E over F p and a generator point G∈ E(F p ) with the large prime order q. SA makes a one-way hash function h() public. Then, SA generates the users' private keys.
( 
. Each m i has some redundancy to protect the scheme against a possible forgery attack [14, 15] . Each u i (i=1,2, …,t) individually generates the signature for the message block m i by taking the following steps.
(1) Select a random integer b i in * q F and compute 
When the clerk receives the sub-signatures, the clerk can verify the validity of the sub-signatures and then generates the threshold authenticated encryption signature on the message m.
(1) Verify the validity of each sub-signature (r i , s i ) by checking whether the equality holds:
. (4) (2) Combine all the sub-signatures into a threshold authenticated encryption signature. 
(3) Send the threshold authenticated encryption signature (r, s, r 1 , r 2 , …,) for the whole message to the designated verifier U v via a public channel.
C. Message recovery phase
After receiving the signature (r,s, r 1 , r 2 ,…, r t ), the verifier U v recovers the message blocks {m 1 , m 2 ,…, m t } by performing the following steps. III. ANALYSIS OF CHC SCHEME Although Chung et al. discussed security of CHC scheme, the scheme is not as secure as claimed. In the following, a design defect and some security weaknesses of CHC scheme will be shown.
A. Correctness analysis
There is a design error in CHC scheme. Even if all the actual signers follow the protocol, Eq. (6) would not hold. The proof of Theorem 1 in [2] is also wrong. So, the verifier U v can not recover the right message m i (i=1,2, …,t) through Eq. (7).
The detailed analysis is as follows. Note that
is Lagrange coefficient.
From the above equations, we obtain
The verifier cannot obtain the right session key from Eq. (6). So U v cannot recover the message m. In fact, at the beginning of signature generation phase in CHC scheme, the actual signer 
The validity of the sub-signature is verified by the following formula:
B. Security analysis However, even if CHC scheme is improved as in Section 3.1 and satisfies correctness, it will still have the following weaknesses. CHC scheme is not robust.
If one signer deviates the protocol during signature generation phase, then CHC scheme will fail. Without loss of generality, assume that u i for some i∈{1,2,…,t} is the malicious signer. After t signers collaborate to divide the message into t connected message blocks {m 1 , m 2 ,…, m t }, the malicious signer u i generates the signature for the message block m i by taking the following steps.
(1) Select a random integer b i in * q F and compute: 
It is not hard to check that the sub-signature (r i , s i ) can pass the sub-signature verification equation (4) . So, the clerk can generate the threshold authenticated encryption signature (r, s, r 1 , r 2 , …, r t ) on message m.
However, when the verifier U v computes the right session key using the signature and the private key x v through the equation (6), he/she will obtain a session key Z ′ rather than Z . This is because:
Therefore, the verifier U v can not recover the right message m through the equation (7) . Moreover, any other participants in the scheme can not identify who the malicious signer is.
In fact, the very reason why the scheme cannot tolerate any malicious signer is that during the signature generation phase the linkage between B i and z i is not verified. CHC scheme suffers from the inside attack.
Assume that the signer u j in the actual signer group is an inside malicious signer who wants to impersonate the signer u k to sign the message block m k . During the signature phase, after the signer u k declared its subsignature, the signer u j impersonates u k and requires that u j and u k need to restart their sub-signatures. u j impersonates u k to re-sign m k as follow.
(1) Select a random integer k b′ in * q F and computes 
It is not hard to check both the sub-signature (r k , k s′ ) and (r j , j s′ ) is valid. But it will violate the claim in [2] that the sub-signature (r k , k s′ ) is actually generated by the participant u k . As a matter of fact, u j can impersonate some actual signers at one time in the same way as mentioned above.
IV. IMPROVEMENT ON CHC SCHEME
In the section, an improved threshold authentication signature scheme is proposed. In the novel scheme, an over-large message is still divided into t readable message blocks among the actual signer group and each actual signer only needs to sign the message block assigned to him. Assume that {u 1 , u 2 ,…, u n } are the signer group. Each u i has its public information x i . U v is the designated verifier. The proposed scheme is composed of the three phases.
A. System initialization phase
SA generates the system parameters: a large prime integer p, a finite field F p , the point group E(F p ) of an elliptic curve E over F p , a one-way hash function h() and a generator point G in E(Fp) with the large prime order q. Then, SA generates the users' public/private keys as in CHC scheme.
B. Signature generation phase
Without loss of generality, assume that t signers {u i | i=1,2,…,t} jointly sign a message m. First, the message m is divided into t connected message blocks {m 1 , m 2 ,…, m t } among the t signers.
The signature generation phase is subdivided into two phases: the sub-signature generation phase and the signature combination phase.
Sub-signature generation phase
In the phase, each signer u i (i=1,2, …,t) generates the signature for the message block m i by performing the following operations.
(1) Select a random integer b i in * q F and compute
(2) Select a random integer k i in * q F and compute 
If the above equations hold, u i goes to the following steps. Note that when a certain signer u i requires to re-sign its message block, the signer must run all the steps during sub-signature generation phase. That is, u i must generate
Signature combination phase
When the clerk receives the sub-signatures, he/she first verifies the validity of the sub-signatures and then combines them into a threshold authenticated encryption signature on m. (1) Check the validity of (r i , s i ) by checking whether the equality holds:
(2) Combine all sub-signatures into a threshold authenticated encryption signature.
(3) Send the threshold authenticated encryption signature (s, r 1 , r 2 , …, r t ) to the designated verifier U v via a public channel.
C. Message recovery phase
After the verifier U v receives the signature (s, r 1 , r 2 , …, r t ), U v recovers the message blocks {m 1 , m 2 ,…, m t } by performing the following steps.
(1) Compute the session key Z.
(2) Recover the message blocks {m 1 , m 2 ,…, m t }.
(3) Validate the redundancy attached to the message blocks m i 's. If they are valid, then all the message blocks can be combined into the whole message m.
V. ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED SCHEME
In the following, we will make some analysis on the propose scheme. On one hand, we will show that our scheme is designed correctly. On the other hand, some cryptanalysis demonstrate that the scheme meets the security properties.
A. Correctness analysis
We show the correctness of the proposed scheme through Theorem 1.
Theorem 1.
In the proposed authentication signature scheme, the clerk can verify the sub-signature (r i , s i ) using Eq. Therefore, the session key Z can be computed through Eq. (23):
From Eq. (19) , it is easy to know that the message blocks can be recovered through Eq. (24) . □
B. Security analysis
We first review two assumptions.
Definition 1 Consider a point group E(F p ) of an elliptic curve E over F p and a generator point G∈E(F p ) with the large prime order q. Given aG∈E(F p ), to compute the discrete logarithm a is difficult, which is called Discrete Logarithm (DL) Assumption of the elliptic curve.
Definition 2 Consider a point group E(F p ) of an elliptic curve E over F p and a generator point G∈E(F p ) with the large prime order q. The assumption that the following two probability distributions are computationally indistinguishable is called Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption of the elliptic curve.
• (aG, bG, abG), where a and b are randomly and independently chosen from Then, we show that the proposed scheme is secure under discrete logarithm assumption (DL) of the elliptic curve [12, 13, 17, 18] and Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption (DDH). The improved scheme inherits the security features of CHC scheme. Therefore, the proposed authenticated signature scheme can resist all the five attacks mentioned in [2] . In the following, we show that the novel scheme can satisfy robustness, confidentiality, unforgeability, integrity, authenticity and non-repudiation.
Robustness: In CHC scheme, when a certain signer u i wants to deviate the protocol during signature generation phase, u i must select a random integer b i in So, any signer who deviates from the protocol can be identified. The proposed scheme is robust.
Confidentiality: If an attacker obtains the authenticated signature (s, r 1 , r 2 , …, r t ), it is computational infeasible to get any information about message blocks m i with the secure hash function h(). The proposed scheme is still secure against chosen message attacks. Because every time the actual signers use random integer b i to produce the session key Z in Eq. (13) . So different sessions have different X z 's. Even if the attacker can get some X z 's. But the attacker cannot use X z 's to recover the message in other sessions. Now consider known message blocks attack against the proposed scheme. Because the proposed scheme applies the division-of-labor signature technique, it is necessary that we consider chosen message block attack in the proposed scheme. For example, the attacker obtains the i-th message block m i and r i . Although the attacker can work out h(i||X z )=r i /m i , the attacker still cannot recover another message block. The attacker only use r j and h(j||X z ) and can recover the j-th message block m j . However, h(i||X z )≠h(j||X z ). Moreover, the attacker cannot compute h(j||X z ) from h(i||X z ).
The analysis demonstrates that any information cannot be derived from the authenticated cipher-text by any one except the designated verifier.
Unforgeability: In the propose scheme, any signers who deviate from the protocol will be identified by other signers. In a similar analysis of confidentiality, the proposed scheme is secure against chosen message attack. In addition, the improved scheme can resist the insider attack in Section 3.2. When a certain signer u i requires that he wants to re-sign its message block and impersonate other signer u j , the signer must run all the steps during the sub-signature generation phase and generate (16). Therefore, the impersonation attack will fail.
Integrity: In the proposed scheme, the designated verifier can identify if the message is valid. After the verifier recovers the message blocks, he can validate them by the redundancy attached to the message blocks m i . Next, if an attacker intercepts the authenticated signature, changes the order of the r i 's and sends them to the designated verifier, the verifier can determine whether the signature blocks have been rearranged by the redundancy associated with the message blocks.
Authenticity: After the designated verifier recovers the message blocks {m 1 , m 2 ,…, m t }, if the redundancy shows that the message blocks m i 's are valid, the designated verifier is sure that the signer group with public key Y s is the actual signer group.
Nonrepudiation: The authenticity and unforgeabilitiy of the proposed scheme imply that the proposed scheme satisfies nonrepudiation.
C. Performance analysis
In [2] , the author considered these authentication encryption schemes by Tseng and Jan [1] , Hwang et al. [7] and Lee and Chang [8] . The detailed analysis showed that the authentication encryption scheme [2] had better properties. Since the proposed authentication encryption scheme is based on CHC scheme, it holds the same advantages over those schemes in [1] , [7] and [8] . We omitted the similar analysis here. In the following, we use these notations to analyze the efficiency of the proposed authentication encryption scheme. We will ignore some light-weight operations such as modular addition and subtraction in T EC-MUL : the time of modulus multiplication operation in the elliptic curve point group. T EC-ADD : the time of modulus addition operation in the elliptic curve point group. Of the authentication encryption schemes, Tseng and Jan's scheme [1] has less communication and lower computational complexity. Now, we compare our proposed scheme in terms of performance efficiency with Tseng and Jan's scheme.
As mentioned in Section II, F p is a finite field with a large prime order p, E(F p ) is a point group of an elliptic curve E over F p and a generator point G∈E(F p ) with the large prime order q. For convenience, we further assume that the system parameters are set up as follows: p is a 1024-bit prime, q is a 160-bit integer and the modulus exponentiation is about 160-bit integer. Tseng and Jan's scheme is based on an exponentiation operation, while the proposed scheme is based on the elliptic curve multiplication and addition operations. Therefore, in order to estimate the efficiency in performance of the two schemes, the three operation units, T EXP , T EC-MUL , and T EC-ADD , must be simplified to the unit of the modulus multiplication operation. Performance simulation results in literature demonstrate that the different operation units can be changed into the modulus multiplication one: one T EXP is about 240 times of one T MUL , one T EC-MUL is about 29 times of one T MUL and one T EC-ADD is times of one 0.12 T MUL . Now, we first consider the communication cost. In Tseng and Jan's scheme, the signature blocks are defined as (r, s, r 1 , r 2 ,…, r t ), while the communication cost is |q|+(t+1)|p|. Although the signer in the improved scheme is a group, the authenticated encryption blocks are less one element than that of Tseng and Jan's scheme. In essence, the signature blocks in our scheme are signature (s, r 1 , r 2 , …, r t ) and the communication cost is |q|+t|p|. In other words, the communication cost of our scheme does not increase as the number of the signers increases.
Next, consider the computational complexities of the signature generation phase and the message recovery phase. As we know, the signer is a group in our scheme. However, when we compare the computational complexities of the signature generation phase and the message recovery phase in the two authenticated encryption schemes, the required amount of computation in the signature generation phase and the message recovery phase will be compared only for every message block m i . Table I demonstrates the performance comparisons between our proposed scheme and Tseng and Jan's scheme in terms of the computational costs for the signature generation phase, the message recovery phase and the total time complexity, respectively. From Table I , it is obvious that our scheme has better performance in comparison with Tseng and Jan's scheme.
Then, we compare our scheme with CHC scheme in terms of the communication cost and the computational costs. In CHC scheme, the signature blocks are defined as (r, s, r 1 , r 2 ,…, r t ), while in the proposed scheme, the signature blocks are signature (s, r 1 , r 2 , …, r t ). The communication cost of the proposed scheme is less one |p| bits than that of CHC scheme.
As for the signature generation phase, our scheme adds 3 T h and 5 T EC-MUL more than CHC scheme. However, CHC scheme suffers from some weaknesses mentioned in Section III. Our scheme has the same time complexity as CHC scheme in the message recovery phase. Moreover, the proposed scheme overcomes the security weaknesses of CHC scheme and meets all the properties of a secure authentication encryption signature scheme.
VI. CONCLUSION
A (t, n) threshold authenticated encryption scheme allows any t or more signers to generate an authenticated encryption on a message so that only the designated verifier can recover the message and verify the message. Compared with the conventional encryption-thensignature schemes, threshold authenticated encryption schemes hold more performance and security properties. Recently, Chung et al. [2] proposed an efficient (t, n) threshold authenticated encryption scheme by applying a division-of-labor signature technique. Chung et al.'s A detailed analysis shows that the proposed authenticated encryption scheme removes the above-mentioned weaknesses and the proposed scheme is secure. Moreover, compared to Tseng and Jan's scheme, our scheme is more efficient.
